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Abstract 
John Rawls was a political philosopher concerned with social justice, specifically 
the best way that society could be structured so that individual rights and duties were 
fairly distributed amongst everyone and division of advantages from social cooperation 
were optimally determined. He believed that this conception of justice rested in principles 
that would be agreed upon by free, self-interested and rational persons in a starting 
position of equality and fairness. The principles of the theory of justice are ones that are 
meant to enable this group of people to cooperate with each other while recognizing that 
individuals in the group both share the same interests and have conflicting interests. 
These principles can be understood as underlying our  most strongly held ethical beliefs – 
the ones that exhibit our ability to make the right moral decisions. This paper explains 
Rawls’ theory of justice, Justice as Fairness, considers an alternative known as “mixed 
conception” and offers Rawls’ response to the alternative before delving deeper into the 
debate to understand whether Rawls’ theory of a “mixed conception” should be chosen 
for a society. Rawls was a notoriously difficult writer so this thesis spends a significant 
amount of time trying to explicate his views and arguments. With that being said, this 
thesis does miss out on some key secondary details but hopes to give a clear and 
compelling picture of his theory, especially the parts that relate to the debate. The debate 
centers on the choice between the difference principle, which calls for society to 
maximize the prospects of the least advantaged, and the social minimum principle, which 
has society set a social minimum that would allow citizens to lead decent lives and take 
measures necessary to ensure everyone can reach that minimum. In the end, I reach the 
conclusion that the social minimum principle, in combination with some of Rawls’ other 
principles, should be used as one of the main principles of justice in society.  
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Chapter 1: Rawls’ Justice as Fairness 
Purpose 
John Rawls set out to create a conception of justice that he felt could be an 
alternative to utilitarianism, the ethical theory that the best course of action is the one that 
maximizes utility, commonly construed as well-being or satisfaction of expectations (A 
Theory of Justice xi-xii). The utilitarianism principle that Rawls mainly addresses is the 
principle of average utility, the utilitarianism principle that directs society to maximize 
the average utility. This form of utilitarianism contrasts with classical utilitarianism, 
which cares about maximizing the total weighted utility. The total weighted utility is 
calculated by taking expectations of representative persons in society, weighting them by 
the number of people with those particular expectations, and adding them together. Rawls 
believes that the principle of average utility is to be favored over classical utilitarianism 
because it implicitly allows a decent level of utility that each person must be allowed to 
possess and Rawls considers this to be important (A Theory of Justice 140-141). 
Following classical utilitarianism would likely mean allowing average utility to fall to its 
lowest acceptable point. For example, governments may consistently promote population 
growth (as each new person holds some utility)  right up to the point where the utility 
gained in the addition of another person would be smaller than the drop in total utility of 
existing persons. This could mean more than ten billion people living on Earth having to 
share the same resources. In that kind of scenario, everyone would have lives that were 
miserable and barely worth living whereas following the principle of average utility can 
ensure decent lives with opportunities for self-expression and growth. Rawls considers 
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the latter consequence to be the rational choice between the two (A Theory of Justice 
141). Another reason to favor it is because he will later make the assumption that the 
parties deciding on principles of justice are self-interested and therefore not concerned 
with total utility, only their own utility (A Theory of Justice 160).  
Utilitarianism was noted by Rawls as the “predominant systematic theory” in 
modern moral philosophy. (A Theory of Justice xvii) He thought an alternative was 
necessary to form as a foundation for the institutions of constitutional democracy, 
specifically one that prioritized peoples’ basic rights and liberties (A Theory of Justice xi-
xii). Utilitarianism says that an action can be just and should be followed if the cost of the 
sacrifices of the few it involves are outweighed by the gains to be had by many. Rawls 
found this problematic because of “an inviolability founded on justice that even the 
welfare of society as a whole cannot override” that he believes is present in every 
individual. (A Theory of Justice 3) Rawls thought there were principles we all believed in 
and relied upon that could not be overridden or sacrificed under any circumstances.  
 
Method 
Rawls believes that a process that he calls reflective equilibrium is essential to 
check that the principles of justice he reaches are correct.1 This process will allow us to 
independently test if the theoretical arguments he gives for the principles and the 
principles themselves are correct. He claims that we actually use reflective equilibrium in 
                                                                
1 This entire paragraph draws upon pages 18 and 41-42 in A Theory of Justice. For ease of readability and 
convenience, I will be using this practice of footnotes in place of parenthetical citation when an entire 
paragraph draws upon the same material.   
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our ordinary lives. Rawls supports the idea that people ordinarily have a moral capacity 
to recognize right from wrong and that they have a desire to follow that moral capacity 
when it is within their capabilities. It is this moral capacity that will form the basis of the 
construction of the correct theory of justice. First, the members of a group will lay out 
their considered judgments, ethical beliefs about specific situations that everyone in the 
group shares and are held by many members of society. An obvious one is “it is wrong to 
torture babies for fun” as this is recognized as a fundamental offense under all 
circumstances. We are asked initially to generalize from these specific considered 
judgments to general principles. At the same time, we attempt to come up with theoretical 
arguments that lead to the same principles that rely on moral premises that are a lot more 
broad and abstract than considered judgments. A moral premise could be “harm is 
generally wrong.” These theoretical arguments and frameworks, which Rawls will offer, 
can help us see if the principles that emerge from the process we conduct with considered 
judgments are correct. We make many judgments every day and a theory of justice fills 
the role of giving us principles that we follow in order to make those judgments when it 
comes to specific situations. Rawls recognizes the likelihood that in trying to come up 
with a set of principles, one may come up with a really compelling set don’t match one’s 
judgments perfectly. This is a sign of “certain irregularities and distortions” that lie in 
considered judgments that show them to be fallible even though we believe strongly in 
them (A Theory of Justice 18). Thus, we can modify our considered judgments because 
we have theoretical reasons for believing that the principles they lead to are wrong or we 
see this strong disconnect between the considered judgments and the compelling 
principles. One considered judgment that American society used to have was that slavery 
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was morally permissible but theories like “all men are equal” and problems in the 
theoretical argument of the principle that underlay that considered judgment (black men 
and women were inferior to white men and women and could be treated as property) 
caused us to seriously question that judgment and revise it. Reflective equilibrium is 
meant to be a back and forth process where considered judgments and principles of the 
theory are modified until they match each other in a way that we find most coherent and 
acceptable with solid theoretical backing.  
One might wonder how Rawls can justify the use of reflective equilibrium itself 
and what other alternatives there may be. The method of reflective equilibrium is mostly 
thought of as a coherence account of justification, and contrasts with its main opponent, 
foundationalist accounts of justification (Daniels). This paper accepts the interpretation of 
reflective equilibrium as a coherence account of justification. Foundationalist accounts 
will take certain moral beliefs as fixed and unrevisable that are directly justified. In other 
words, there accounts accept basic moral beliefs that need not rely on anything else for 
their justification (Daniels). In contrast, Rawls believed that even our strongest moral 
convictions should be considered provisional fixed points and their correctness relies on 
their fitting principles that we come up with and having the right theoretical support for 
them (Theory of Justice 18). Rawls believed that a conception of justice must come from 
the “mutual support of many considerations” because to propose the existence of 
something like self-evident premises or basic beliefs would be to rely upon our fallible 
intuitions instead of a careful and deliberate process like reflective equilibrium (Theory 
Of Justice 19). This process can be very helpful because it can help one decide one’s 
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stance on certain issues that one is unsure about and come up with coherent and 
consistent views that are supported by principles. 
 
The Original Position 
Though Rawls has given us a method to check principles of justice, we still need 
to have a position from which to start our reasoning to obtain the principles themselves. 
Rawls is a social contract theorist2. Social contract theories present the view that the 
morals and government of a society are dictated by an agreement made at the conception 
of the society that all agree to in a so-called pre-society “state of nature” where 
individuals hold no binding power over one another. His original position is intended to 
reflect the state of nature in the social contract theory and is the situation where people 
act as representatives of all adults and choose and agree for once and for all what is just 
and unjust. Imagine a collection of individuals that have a chance to design a new society 
and its institutions by deciding on the correct conception of justice. This original position 
is supposed to embody the conditions that we all agree would result in legitimate 
principles. What is special about this original position is that though we can think of it as 
a gathering of people, “the original position must be interpreted so that one can at any 
time adopt its perspective” and presumably, reach its conclusions once we understand 
how it is to be specified (Theory of Justice 120). Rawls stipulates that people in this 
original position have to be free and rational persons and thinks we agree these two traits 
must be possessed by those in the original position. (Theory of Justice 10) Freedom and 
                                                                
2 Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph paraphrases material from pages 15-17 in Theory of Justice.  
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rationality possessed by the people will allow them to be able to willingly choose the 
correct principles of justice after deliberation without being coerced to do otherwise. To 
ensure that everybody has a voice and can be free in the maximum sense of the word, 
Rawls also mandates that the persons in the original position have to be equal. In 
addition, no person is supposed to have a special understanding of the “good”, or 
“justice”. The point of the original position is to figure out what these two concepts are so 
the parties in it cannot have preconceived notions of what they should or should not be.  
Other stipulations are placed upon this original position that can be bundled up in 
a “veil of ignorance”, designed to produce fair principles (A Theory of Justice 118-119).  
As Rawls says, “no one knows his place in society his class position or social status, nor 
does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence, strength…their conceptions of the good or their psychological propensities” 
(A Theory of Justice 11). These stipulations are added to ensure that the principles that 
emerge are truly fair and are not selected to benefit or harm people in particular 
circumstances (A Theory of Justice 11). The only thing that the parties in the original 
position know is that society will be subject to circumstances of justice (that they will 
define) and general facts about human society and other necessary general facts (A 
Theory of Justice 119). Rawls gives as an example of a general fact that “a conception of 
justice…should generate its own support” (A Theory of Justice 119). In other words, the 
principles in the correct conception of justice should cause people to acquire the sense of 
justice and act according the principles once it is in place in society. Rawls sees the veil 
of ignorance as something that many people would naturally come up with if asked to 
consider conditions in the original position but also sees it as present in Immanual Kant’s 
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doctrine of the categorical imperative (A Theory of Justice 121-122). Let’s take a look at 
his own argument for the veil of ignorance before examining how Rawls sees it as a 
natural application of Kant’s categorical imperative.  
Rawls considered that these specific contingencies (non-necessary facts or 
properties of people) like possession of wealth or high artistic talent would motivate 
people to exploit circumstances for their own gain and were arbitrary in a moral sense (A 
Theory of Justice 118). A billionaire in the original position who was cognizant of his 
own wealth may wish to allow a high level of inequality with privileges for the richest in 
society or at least push for principles as far as he could in that direction. But Rawls 
believed that possession of a lot of wealth or one’s status as member of a high social class 
should have no bearing on one’s achievements as he considered them irrelevant factors. 
Thus, the parties in the original position can be forced to argue for a conception of justice 
using only reasoning with the restrictions listed above. They must come up with 
principles that everyone will know of and can be complied with by everyone (A Theory of 
Justice 119). Rawls noted that the veil of ignorance actually allows a consensus to be 
reached on a definite theory of justice (A Theory of Justice 120-121). Without it, the 
billionaire would probably not be able to settle on a set of principles with the vagrant, the 
blue-collar worker and the university professor in the original position. There would be 
an extremely complicated bargaining scenario that may not ever reach a conclusion. 
The categorical imperative was the key concept in Kant’s moral philosophy and 
holds that potential principles can be satisfactory only if they could be made into 
universal laws of nature. This means that the principles must be able to be applied 
unconditionally at any time to any moral agent. Rawls was especially impressed with 
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Kant’s notion of autonomy, which means choosing principles that can best express our 
own nature as free and equal rational beings3. Allowing someone to keep the knowledge 
they have of their own circumstances would incentivize them to act in accordance with 
their desires as a specific character or kind of character in society instead of purely as a 
free and equal rational being. The principles of justice that the parties will generate do not 
assume particular goals but aim at rational goods any person would want and thus would 
be suitable for any person.  
Since everyone in the original position is equal, free, and rational and lacks 
knowledge of many distinguishing features that might incline them towards principles 
that favor or slight themselves or other people, Rawls considers the original position fair 
and productive (A Theory of Justice 16). The veil of ignorance allows there to be a 
unanimous choice of a conception of justice, instead of the parties reaching an 
unproductive impasse, because the differences amongst people is unknown and everyone 
is rational and free (A Theory of Justice, 121). A specific choice will be made because 
there is no reason to hold out and everyone is in favor of cooperation (A Theory of Justice 
121) 
Rawls thinks that these conditions that he places on the original position rely on 
presumptions that are “natural and plausible” with some that are “innocuous or even 
trivial” (A Theory of Justice 16). Alternative initial positions could involve a different 
number of parties with distinct characteristics instead of a veil of ignorance, either one or 
very few. The problem with these initial positions is that either group, especially the 
former, may come up with principles that members of society would not agree to and thus 
                                                                
3 This paragraph paraphrases material from pages 221-224 from A Theory of Justice.  
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would be governed by laws, institutions and practices based on principles of which they 
did not give their consent to. Without their consent in its formulation, Rawls would argue 
that the justice in that society would have no jurisdiction over their actions. Without 
knowing one’s circumstances in society or what would be good for them, the parties in 
the original position must consider what would be acceptable and best for every member 
of society, regardless of their position as they themselves could become any member. In 
other words, every possible consequence of the principles must be okay to the parties for 
them to be agreed upon. An important point that Rawls brings up is that the veil of 
ignorance fulfills the crucial role of ensuring that the same principles will always be 
chosen in the original position regardless of time, persons, and any other factor (A Theory 
of Justice 120). This is necessary as the principles of justice should not be contingent – 
dependent on any factors. 
Rawls says that the principles of justice that emerge from the original position 
will be correct because they are the best results that a social theorist can come up with but 
he suggests that we, as persons outside of the original position, must use reflective 
equilibrium to ensure that they and the whole process is correct (A Theory of Justice 17. 
He says we may “see if the principles which would be chosen match our considered 
convictions of justice or extend them in an acceptable way” (A Theory of Justice 17). 
This is intended to be done in a relativistic way by comparing different sets of principles 
to see if another set should be chosen and if one’s judgments should be revised to match 
with one of the alternatives. Rawls argues that his Justice as Fairness emerges from the 
original position that he lays instead of other conceptions of justice (which could 
arguably come from other original positions with different assumptions built in) and also 
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argues that reflective equilibrium moves us to choose it over the other conceptions. His 
explicit comparisons and Waldron’s argument on mixed conceptions will be explored 
further below.  
 As suggested earlier, reflective equilibrium itself is actually used to justify the 
original position. Rawls anticipated that some may still wonder why we accept this 
hypothetical scenario. Though hypothetical, the original positon does embody conditions 
that allow agreed upon principles that come out of a scenario to be fair (A Theory of 
Justice 19). This notion that we want the principles that result from a fair process is 
virtually indisputable and these conditions are ones that Rawls sees as widely accepted or 
at least supported by strong philosophical reasons (A Theory of Justice 19). It also allows 
people to have autonomy and comes from a “perspective of eternity” meaning that it 
doesn’t fit a particular human situation but should be accepted by any rational beings (A 
Theory of Justice (ToJ, 514). The original position itself can be seen as the “principle” or 
theoretical framework in the process of reflective equilibrium that fits with our 
considered judgments of the right way to reach principles of justice for a society. 
A lot more can be said about reflective equilibrium as a way to justify Rawls’ 
entire philosophy, including the acceptance of social contract precepts, but that is not the 
focus of this paper and I hope that the above exposition serves to give a decent idea of 
Rawls’ two-pronged justification for the original position and how the principles are to be 
selected.  
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Principles of Justice as Fairness 
Rawls believes that two principles will be chosen from the original position. They 
are listed in his exact words below: 
First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for others. 
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both 
a. To the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged4 and 
b. Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity. (A Theory of Justice 53 and 72) 
Part a of the second principle is also known as the difference principle and will be 
referred to as such. 
Fair equality of opportunity is the notion that individuals with “similar abilities 
and skills [and willingness to use them] should have similar life chances” (A Theory of 
Justice 63). One can imagine trying to institute fair equality of opportunity by offering 
free high-quality public school to all children so that poor students can achieve as much 
success in the educational system as the rich students attending elite private schools. 
An important note is that the principles are arranged in a serial order with the first 
prior to the second (A Theory of Justice 53-54). In other words, no liberties may be 
                                                                
4 The principle actually calls for maximization of the welfare of the worst-off, followed by maximization of 
the welfare of the second worst-off, all the way to the top.  
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compromised or infringed upon to better serve the second principle. For example, you 
may not restrict an organization’s right to protest freely (if that is a basic liberty in a 
society following these principles) with the sole justification that it is reducing economic 
efficiency by block commercial activity.  
We can understand the principles within “Justice as Fairness” better if we think 
about how they are practiced in American society today. The principle of equality is most 
prominently manifested in the First Amendment to the Constitution, as it protects the 
right to freedom of speech and religion. The government allows you to say anything in 
any medium with restrictions that are intended to preserve the rights of others. One of 
these restrictions concerns incitement, or advocacy of the use of force. Speech that 
advocates for the use of force violates the rights of a certain individual or individuals to 
not be harmed. In addition to these two, Rawls offers freedom of the person and political 
liberty, among others (A Theory of Justice 53). These rights are limited because while 
they are extensive, they are designed to ensure the exercise of these rights does not 
infringe upon the liberties of other people. Other examples of basic liberties can be found 
in the Fourth Amendment (Unreasonable Searches and Seizures) and the Sixth 
Amendment (Right to a Fair Trial) 
As for the second principle, American society does have measures intended to 
reduce social and economic inequalities such as programs like food stamps (credits given 
to people who fall below a certain income threshold to buy food) that comprise part of the 
safety net. However, the inequalities that are present in society were not the result of a 
process designed to advantage everyone and certainly did not end up doing so. These 
inequalities largely came to be due to the operation of the free market, institutional 
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racism going all the way to slavery, and laws and regulations that have aimed to help 
certain groups of people. In addition, positions and offices have not been open to all 
citizens throughout US history and even today there are still issues despite the presence 
of laws designed to combat them. 
 Two important points have to be made about the difference principle, one 
concerning redistribution to the poor and the other concerning the allowance of the worst-
off to not work and be rewarded. 
 It is common-sense upon reading the difference principle to think that Rawls 
wants to heavily tax the wealthy or reduce the budget for certain governmental programs 
to redistribute to the least advantaged. However, Rawls thought that there would not have 
to be as much redistribution as in current society because the guarantee of equal basic 
liberties and the implementation of fair equality of opportunity would greatly decrease 
the disparities that currently exist in society (Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 161). 
Both of these would allow a lot more people to be educated, healthy and have increased 
opportunities to find work and improve their prospects economically (A Theory of Justice 
136 - 137) Thus, there would be less distribution and there would be a stronger emphasis 
on changing institutions so as to improve the income and wealth of the least advantage 
 Another concern people have upon examining the difference principle, one that 
can still be held given one’s correct understanding of redistribution under the principle, is 
that the poor that do nothing would still receive tremendous benefits from society. Rawls 
addresses this by pointing out there is an assumption in the difference principle that 
citizens are willing to work (if they are able) and share in society’s burdens if they 
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believe fair cooperation exists5. He thus mandates that only citizens that do work hard, 
assuming they are capable of doing do, will receive support from society. Thus, there 
would be no free-loaders in a Rawlsian society.   
Arguments behind the Principles of Justice6 
Rawls believes that once you accept his hypothetical original position, the 
principles of justice that he proposes would be reached by the parties through deliberation 
behind a veil of ignorance where each party is deliberating from the position of their own 
self-interest (A Theory of Justice 102). The reasoning he has to give is highly intuitive 
and will let us see why these two principles were picked among all the possibilities. 
In the original position, the veil of ignorance ensures that individuals cannot 
secure benefits for themselves or a group that they are a part of and as rational 
individuals, there is no reason why they would seek out to be disadvantaged anyway. As 
each party cannot gain more than an equal share and has no desire for anything less than 
an equal share, the parties would agree to principles mandating equal distribution instead 
of a principle that allows for unequal distribution. This means they would want maximum 
equal basic liberties for everyone. Rawls also notes that the parties in the original position 
would acknowledge the possibility that they may have “moral or religious obligations 
which they must keep themselves free to honor” behind the veil of ignorance (A Theory 
of Justice, 181). He calls this equal liberty of conscience a fixed point in our considered 
judgments and it is a further consideration behind the serial order of the principles as we 
                                                                
5 This sentence and the following sentences in the paragraph paraphrase material from page 179 in Justice 
as Fairness: A Restatement.  
6 Unless otherwise stated, this section paraphrases material taken from pages 102 to 105 in A Theory of 
Justice 
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would not want to sacrifice these liberties for any utility. The crux of Rawls’ argument is 
that people recognize they should be able to do whatever they want and pursue the 
interests they have as long as they don’t infringe upon the rights of other people and their 
basic liberties.  
For the second principle, Rawls says that there should be social and economic 
inequalities. The appeal of the difference principle is made apparent by comparisons to its 
alternatives. One might initially think that the parties would opt for an equal division of 
income and wealth instead of any inequality but this turns out not economically efficient 
at all. If everyone was guaranteed to have the same income and wealth, productivity 
would heavily slump as people would have no motivation to work hard and improve. 
People would also not necessarily enter the careers and the positions in which they would 
be the most productive as they may opt for the ones that are easiest and most convenient. 
It turns out that social and economic inequality can improve the lives of everyone 
compared to perfect equality. Of course we would want some productivity rather than the 
total economic collapse that perfect equality would generate. Now we face the question 
of how much inequality to allow. 
Rawls adds a specific condition attached to inequality. Due to the possibility of 
the parties in the original position ending up as the least advantaged in society, Rawls’ 
thinking goes that they would only allow inequalities that benefit the least advantaged the 
most. The main alternative to this that Rawls sees is allowing inequalities to be what he 
calls “pareto-optimal” (A Theory of Justice 58). This is often a term used by economists 
to refer to a situation where goods are distributed so that there is no way of redistribution 
so that one person or group can have their circumstances improved without 
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disadvantaging someone else. Imagine baking a hundred cookies and giving them all to 
different groups in society. Pareto-optimal efficiency could lead to a situation where 
some individuals are extremely poor while others are extremely rich even as society as a 
whole improves. One group could have 90 cookies and 10 other groups could each share 
1 cookie but that would be acceptable. A related problem is that there are many different 
points at which society would be efficient and there would be no way of deciding which 
one is most valid (A Theory of Justice 61). As we will see later, Rawls believes this 
problem of “vagueness” is unacceptable and wants to be able to pinpoint the level of 
inequality that would best serve society. Overall, Rawls thinks that the precision, security 
and efficiency generated by the difference principle cause us to choose it over egalitarian, 
utilitarian and pareto-optimal principles. 
Fair equality of opportunity is added on as a condition to the second principle 
concerning the arrangement of inequalities to try to correct the problem of natural and 
social contingencies on the initial distribution of assets (A Theory of Justice 77-78). In 
layman’s terms, Rawls understands that while the initial distribution in society may be 
fair, factors like good luck or the social connections one has access to thanks to one’s 
parents can have a serious effect on how one’s talents and abilities are developed and 
used. He believes those factors are arbitrary from a moral point of view and thus should 
not have such an influence. The only way to balance against this problem is to add fair 
equality of opportunity to create a more meritocratic society where your position in the 
social system has no effect on your success or social mobility.  
Rawls thinks that these two principles allow the privileged and the unprivileged to 
work together in the face of necessity to improve overall welfare. It ensures that the 
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advantaged in society do not work to increase their advantage at the cost of the less 
fortunate. 
 
Argument against Utilitarianism 
In the original position, Rawls says that people would not pick the principle of 
average utility and would instead opt for the principles in Justice as Fairness (A Theory of 
Justice 152). Though the paper’s focus is not on utilitarianism as it relates to Rawls, this 
paper explains Rawls’ argument against it to give a better idea of how one should think 
about the original position.   
The parties in the original position face uncertainty when choosing their 
principles because they pretty much know nothing about the interests that they are 
representing but the principles are supposed to govern the rest of their lives and their 
descendants’ lives. This is guaranteed by the veil of ignorance. One of their options is 
utilitarianism. Utilitarian principles governing a society would result in one with a wide 
variance in the well-being and possession of income and wealth of the individuals in, 
with everything designed with the goal to maximize average utility. Some people would 
end up in a pretty terrible state in this society, without the means to escape their state. 
The parties thinking in the original position acknowledge this to be possibility for them 
and Rawls thinks nobody would want to have this as a possibility open to them (A Theory 
of Justice 1155). Since there are multiple ways for a society to implement utilitarian 
principles, the specific details of what the average utility or who the worst-off is and how 
many of them there are is unknown. In this scenario, Rawls believes that the 
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representatives would follow the maximin rule, the rule to “adopt [out of] the alternatives 
the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others” (A Theory of 
Justice 133). In other words, they would ensure that their worst case scenario is as good 
as possible. This reflects how risk-averse Rawls thinks we would be in the original 
position when choosing principles that will underlie the basic structure of society and 
ones we must abide by due to our agreement.  Rawls believes that when one follows the 
maximin rule without knowledge of the likelihood of different outcomes, one will not 
choose any conception of justice that could lead to unacceptable minimum outcomes but 
will only choose a conception of justice with a satisfactory worst outcome (a level where 
he/she is willing to live) (A Theory of Justice 135-136). He also thinks we don’t really 
care about social mobility as long we’re guaranteed to be above a decent social 
minimum. This means that a utilitarian society with many chances for the worst off to 
climb up out over poverty into prosperity would still be largely irrelevant to the parties. 
The utilitarian society is likely to have unacceptable minimum outcomes so that the 
majority of society can benefit off of the labor and sacrifice of the minority. Rawls thus 
argues that the parties behind the veil will see that a satisfactory minimum and protection 
of liberties is guaranteed by the difference principle whereas the utility principle does not 
and could lead to terrible conditions such as those found in slavery. I’ve given the above 
argument based on rational choice against utilitarianism on behalf of Rawls but this paper 
later introduces another moral argument that another author sees Rawls as giving against 
utilitarianism. 
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Chapter 2: Debate between Justice as Fairness and Mixed 
Conceptions 
Mixed conceptions7 
Though Rawls spends most of his book, Theory of Justice, defending Justice as 
Fairness as the choice of those in the original position against the “Principle of Average 
Utility”, he does spend some time defending it against the “mixed conception” 
conceptions of justice as he believes many see them as more plausible than his theory. A 
“mixed conception” of justice takes the principle of greatest equal liberty in Justice as 
Fairness and its priority over the other principle as correct but substitutes the difference 
principle for the principle of average utility, subject or not subject to a constraint and with 
or without fair equality of opportunity. The “mixed conception” that Rawls focuses on is 
the one that philosophers generally consider the most plausible and substitutes the 
difference principle for a principle that guarantees a decent minimum before creating a 
social system with the highest average wealth possible. In other words, it has as part of it 
the principle of average utility with a minimum boundary, which Rawls will later call the 
principle of restricted utility. While in Rawls’ imaginary country he seeks to put the least 
advantaged in the best possible position, countries like the United States follow much 
closer to the “mixed conception” with a social minimum that’s “guaranteed” though 
measures like welfare and most of the government’s efforts spent on boosting the 
economy to increase average utility. Below is a simple table based on one used by Jeremy 
                                                                
7 This entire section paraphrases material from Chapter 49, Comparison with Mixed Conceptions, from 
pages 277 to 285 in A Theory of Justice.  
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Waldron8 to illustrate two societies, one with the social minimum principle and the other 
with the difference principle: 
Figure 1: Societies based on social minimum and difference principle 
 Economy governed by the 
social minimum principle 
Economy governed by the 
difference principle 
Best-off 20% $ 200,000 $ 160,000 
Middle 60% $ 60,000 $ 50,000 
Worst-off 20% $ 20,000 $ 30,000 
 
The numbers in the table refer to yearly income earned by an individual. The table shows 
that the first society has a stronger economy though the worst-off earn less than their 
counterparts in the other society. The extra prosperity is instead shared by the top 80%. 
Keep in mind that with the social minimum principle in place, everyone is guaranteed to 
earn a certain level of income (one can imagine it to be just below $20,000 in this case) 
and incentives can be introduced that do not have to help the worst-off in society but are 
designed to reward productivity. The table will be used later on when Waldron’s 
arguments are introduced. 
It’s important to note that Rawls is not able to use the argument he used against 
the utilitarian view against mixed conceptions because of the primacy of the first 
principles and the guarantee of a decent minimum. Like in Theory of Justice, liberties 
will never be sacrificed for utility when following mixed conceptions because the equal 
                                                                
8 Waldron uses an outdated table in his chapter, Rawls and the social minimum. 
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liberty principle takes precedent over the second principle concerning inequalities. The 
worst off in society will not have a life that people would not want to live because the 
representatives have agreed to the level of the decent minimum. Rawls’ has two main 
interconnected arguments against mixed conceptions. One concerns the selection and 
adjustment of this decent social minimum and the other is that the difference principle, 
not the principle of restricted utility, is the one that accords with our considered 
judgments after some reflection. In a way, the second argument for the difference 
principle offers a solution to the problem with the social minimum illustrated with the 
first argument. 
Rawls believes that the principles behind this determination of the decent social 
minimum would rely too much on intuitive judgments. Consider how a policy maker 
would determine this level. At first, she would consider the necessities for living, 
including shelter, food and clothing of reasonable quality and access. These would 
constitute the baselines for survival. Already we run into issues concerning quantity and 
quality. What constitutes decent affordable housing? How much emphasis should be 
placed on nutrition if that involves higher costs? What kind of goods do we have to 
bundle into a package for new mothers? These and many other questions must be 
answered to set a minimum. It seems almost uncontroversial to add other benefits like 
basic education (including adult education and vocational classes), healthcare coverage 
but these face more complexities in terms of spelling out actually what these benefits 
should be. Beyond the necessities and benefits (and assuming the policymaker figures out 
the particular details of them), it becomes more problematic to consider whether things 
such as opportunities to see arts & entertainment, access to the internet and higher 
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education should be considered part of a decent social minimum and different people will 
likely have different answers. The social minimum would need to be flexible enough to 
be applied as society changes so it is something that needs to be constantly revisited. By 
contrast, the difference principle is a lot more straightforward as it calls for the prospects 
of the least favored to be promoted as far as possible. One can even see how applying 
Rawls’ two principles would result in a similar outcome as applying mixed conceptions 
with the principle of restricted utility, as Rawls suspects would be the case. Setting 
inequalities to benefit the worst off in society will be in effect guaranteeing them a social 
minimum because they would be raised to have the best prospects they could possibly 
have, though the minimum here is not set by a material standard as with a typical social 
minimum. Since the difference principle allows helping every group in society starting 
with the worst-off9, average utility will also increase. The increase in average utility here 
would be a consequence of the difference principle without there being a deliberate 
attempt to have it happen. This idea that they could be the same seems to assume the 
mixed conception of being capable of adopting a very high social minimum that would 
mirror the “social minimum” in effect with the difference principle. 
Now let’s see how Rawls thought that the difference principle was acceptable to 
us through reflective equilibrium. Rawls understood that we often seek to meet the ends 
of average utility and parity/equality but have difficulty weighting each one. In other 
words, it’s common sense for us to want society to be as best off as possible but for there 
also to be balance and equality so everyone can enjoy prosperity. He argues that a 
                                                                
9 In addition to the elaboration of the principle in footnote 1 whereby everyone is directly aided with 
priority on the worst-off, helping the least advantaged in society will reduce negative elements in society 
like crime and allow them to contribute more to the economy and society. 
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conception of justice cannot be one that allows us to just exercise our judgment to the 
best of our ability within a framework but needs to be precise. This precision ensures that 
we are not trying “to exercise one’s judgment as best one can within the framework of 
these ends as guidelines” (A Theory of Justice 280). This exercise of one’s judgment 
would make answering certain questions of justice very difficult as we’d have to balance 
different ends like average utility and equality and we can come up with different 
uncertain answers. Rawls entertains the idea that our everyday judgments are guided by 
the difference principle but drops it shortly after. Rawls considers the consequences that 
come from following the two principles of justice as acceptable to us and our convictions 
upon reflection. He gives an example of how the difference principle accords with our 
considered judgments and back this up with political theory. Rawls points that that is 
typical for a democratic society to appeal to the common interest, to wish to promote the 
greater good. Understanding this to mean more than just maximizing the efficiency in 
society and recognizing that there is no way for a government to aid everyone equally, 
the least advantaged in the society seems consistent with respecting equal liberties and 
fair opportunity, both values that a democratic society also cherishes (the first principle 
and a part of the second principle with its independent rationale). Rawls thinking here is 
that since this practice is something widely done and one in which we have confidence in, 
it can be one of those fixed points that does match the difference principle that he has 
developed from the original position and should act as support for its legitimacy. The 
difference principle is supposed to accord with our considered judgments, as this example 
tries to show, and to also be a satisfying way to answer those questions that common 
sense is incapable of answering. 
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Waldron’s arguments against Rawls 
Jeremy Waldron, a law and philosophy professor, argued that a needs-based 
conception of a social minimum is better supported by Rawls’ arguments for the 
difference principle than the difference principle itself (Waldron 251-252) The needs-
based conception refers to a social minimum that is necessary for “people to lead decent 
and tolerable lives” (Waldron 250). This is in contrast to a social minimum based on an 
egalitarian principle where society’s goods are equally divided and then distributed 
amongst its members. This is part of a conception of justice that is a “mixed conception” 
for it contains the principle of average utility subject to a constraint involving a needs-
based social minimum, and Waldron favors this principle over the difference principle in 
Rawls’ theory of justice. We’ll quickly see what Waldron sees as Rawls’ objections to 
the social minimum specifically then explore Waldron’s own positive arguments for the 
social minimum using Rawls’ theory first and then claims about need. One can see 
Waldron as responding to the two arguments I present on Rawls’ behalf above.  
Before we go into arguments, we try to gain a better understanding of the 
difference in societies governed by the social minimum principle and the difference 
principle and the existence of a social minimum in a society with Justice as Fairness. 
Waldron comes up with an imaginary case very similar to the one illustrated in the table 
above to allow him to contrast the earnings of various classes in society in economics 
governed by the two principles10. As you can see from the table, the economy governed 
                                                                
10 This paragraph paraphrases material from pages 254-255 from Waldron’s chapter, Rawls and the social 
minimum. 
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by the social minimum is overall more productive than the economy governed by the 
difference principle. Waldron makes the key observation that the difference principle 
would make society adjust inequalities solely so that they benefit the worst off in society 
the most whereas the social minimum principle does not make society focus on those 
individuals unless they are below the social minimal level. If no one is below this level, 
the social minimum principle will allow for inequalities if they serve a utilitarian purpose 
to maximize average utility. Notwithstanding Rawls’ concern that the application of the 
social minimum principle may be equal in effect to the principle of the difference 
principle, one can expect more inequality to result from the social minimum principle. 
This greater inequality actually spurs more productivity as shown in the example, perhaps 
through promoting savings and investment by companies and incentivizing individuals to 
work harder. There is a school of thought that Rawls is open to in his later writings that 
the greater inequality in a society like the one with the social minimum would not result 
in greater productivity but I will be adopting Waldron’s assumption that his society 
would in fact be more prosperous. The social minimum in Rawls’ society is the point that 
maximizes the expectations of the least advantaged group whilst still being low enough 
so that economic efficiency isn’t compromised. 
Waldron sees an implicit answer and an explicit answer for Rawls’ rejection of 
the social minimum conception in A Theory of Justice. The implicit argument is that the 
greater inequalities allowed by the social minimum conception (check out the left column 
vs. the right column in Figure 1) means one could face a worse worst possible outcome 
and no one would take that risk (Waldron 254-255). The explicit argument is that the 
social minimum cannot be set on non-intuitionistic grounds or in a way that doesn’t refer 
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to the difference principle (Waldron 255). This is the first argument I elaborate on in the 
“Mixed conception” section right before this section.  
Waldron sets on the task to set the social minimum, something that Rawls figures 
could not be done in a principled, rational manner. To do this, he incorporates Rawls’ 
reasoning against utilitarianism that Rawls uses as support for the difference principle to 
arrive at the social minimum instead11. He feels that the social minimum is best supported 
by Rawls’ rejection of utilitarianism and Rawls’ theory.  
Waldron sees Rawls as arguing that it is irrational for the parties in the original 
position to take the risks involved in accepting a principle with utilitarian elements 
thinking that they’ll end up doing well. This irrationality is not because of the uncertainty 
as I suggest Rawls thinks it is but because taking this risk would be a one-off gamble 
whereby the parties recognize that the consequences would likely be almost permanent in 
the sense that people will remain in the social position they start out with. In this one-off 
gamble, Rawls believes that the maximin rule should be applied. To do otherwise and 
choose utilitarian principles or other principles with a lot of inequality is to irrationally 
think that bad luck will be balanced by good luck and a terrible start in life will be 
balanced by fortunate events. Though these considerations play a part in Rawls’ 
argument favoring the difference principle over the principle of mixed utility, Waldron 
interprets Rawls’ main argument to actually be a moral one that is tied to these 
considerations.  
                                                                
11 The definition of the social minimum is covered in section III of Waldron’s chapter, from pages 256 to 
263. 
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Waldron believes Rawls’ main objection against the adoption of utilitarian 
principles in the original position is that the parties will reject average utilitarian 
principles because they are not sure they can do what is required of them if they fare 
poorly in the “gamble” and have to live unsatisfactory lives. The contract created in the 
original position requires an absolute commitment from the participant (in all 
circumstances) to the life that he/she will live. Rawls himself points to this problem 
regarding the “strains of commitment” as critical in arguing against utilitarianism and for 
his principles. Waldron quotes Rawls in saying “the parties must weigh with care whether 
they will be able to stick with their commitment in all circumstances” (Waldron 260). If 
one is unlucky enough to be one of the least advantaged in the society governed by 
utilitarian principles, Waldron believes that the individual will not be able to maintain a 
full commitment to society’s institutions. Instead, it is a lot more likely that the individual 
will be sympathetic to a change in the utilitarian society for something else. With this in 
mind and the determination of the parties to meet their commitments and act honorably, 
participants will not take any bets that have as a possibility of “desperate poverty” 
(Waldron 261). Here we can try and examine further the reasoning behind individual’s 
abandonment of full commitment in the case where she turns out to be one of the least 
advantaged. Waldron asks whether this is because the individual is aware of the 
possibility that the lot of the worst in society could be improved or whether this is 
because the individual is unsatisfied with their level of well-being regardless of what may 
be possible. Waldron thinks that the advocate for the difference principle will say that the 
level of disaffection of someone is the same regardless of what level of welfare they are 
at if inequality with other classes is equal in both cases. For example, the advocate would 
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say disaffection felt by someone that earned $10,000 a year in a society would be the 
same as someone earning $18,000 in a different society if both had the same level of 
inequality and both income levels were considered below the poverty line. Waldron 
disagrees and does see a difference and thinks that a guarantee of a social minimum 
would dramatically increase coincidence in the parties to honor their commitments 
because he feels the source of the disaffection comes from not enjoying a decent level of 
welfare instead of not being in the best situation possible.  
Waldron thinks that people in the original position do not turn naturally to the 
difference principle where the worst-off are guaranteed to be at the best position they 
could be but would rather opt for the social minimum principle, where the worst-off are 
guaranteed to be at a decent position. This principle fixes a minimum just above the level 
where individuals would not be able to keep their complete commitment to the 
institutions of society or serious disaffection and discontent will occur and is a precise fix 
to the problem concerning the “strains of commitment”. This would allow the members 
in the original position to be confident that they are bargaining in good faith. Waldron 
adds that the suggestion by Rawls that this principle produces results equal with the 
difference principle relies on the assumption that “a member of the worst-off group in 
any society will always withdraw his allegiance from its institutions if they impose any 
avoidable sacrifices on him, no matter how well of he is”. In other words, the worst-off in 
society would have the disaffection mentioned earlier in any scenario in which their 
expectations are not maximized. Waldron considers this unrealistic as it is unreasonable 
for them to have such a high standard for the lives of the least advantaged in society 
(Waldron, 263). Waldron considers his answer to Rawls’ objection a satisfactory way to 
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“produce a basis for determining a social minimum…neither intuitionistic nor dependent 
in the last resort on a covert appeal back to the difference principle” (Waldron, 263). 
Waldron claims he has successfully defined a social minimum here that is both precise on 
non-intuitionistic manner and robust (people can seriously commit to it) but if this is so, 
this only removes some of the problems with the social minimum principle. Waldron still 
must argue why those in the original position would choose the social minimum principle 
over the difference principle for their theory of justice. 
Waldron then uses another angle to positively plead his case that does not rely on 
Rawls’ specific writings12. He emphasizes that the choice that the parties in the original 
positon face is used as a device allowing us to understand fundamental ideas behind 
justice like freedom and equality. He thinks that by parallel, it is possible to take claims 
about the social minimum in the original position to understand the fundamental ideas 
and values behind the social minimum.  
The principle of Waldron’s social minimum is backed by claims about need. Need 
can involve having to endure a lack of something vital and the manifestation of this kind 
of need can be seen by violent actions taken to procure what is lacked. Contract theories 
depend on members of a society working with its institutions and thus stress allegiance 
and voluntary cooperation of its members. Waldron believes that individuals in a society 
should not have the kind and degree of need that spurs reckless impulsion of action 
(equivalent to the breach of a commitment) like starting a violent revolution as that need 
at a certain level can seriously threaten the viability of society. He also thinks that “the 
reckless impulsion of action by need is a normal human phenomenon and not something 
                                                                
12 Waldron’s positive argument is contained in section IV of Waldron’s chapter from pages 263 to 267. 
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irregular or rare” (Waldron 266). Thus, in producing principles of justice to govern a 
society, we must ensure that this need is not present. This need is backed up by our basic 
ethical convictions and thus cannot be suppressed by force.  
Waldron thinks that there is a level of deprivation where no one is able to 
“support, operate and respect institutions…where he can conceive of any practicable 
alternative” (Waldron, 264). When enough people reach this level of deprivation, the 
society they are in loses its legitimacy and faces danger because society is seen to violate 
basic principles, ones that are arguably present in the first principle concerning equal 
liberties. The right to be treated with respect and given to chance to fulfill one’s own 
potential is violated.  Supplying this need is possible with a social minimum that is 
designed expressly to meet the need and the prioritization by society for all to meet this 
social minimum. When this is done, the citizens will work together with society’s 
institutions to promote the laws that are derived from accepted principles of justice. 
 It is key to note that the claims about need do not support the “extra 
egalitarianism of the Rawlsian difference principle” (Waldron, 267) because fulfilling 
this need requires only a minimum level of material well-being, not a particularly high 
level. In other words, Rawls needs another basis to justify why the poor have to have a 
life higher than the decent minimum that Waldron has managed to justify. The claims 
about need can be viewed through the process of reflective equilibrium, with those claims 
as fixed points that we all deeply believe and his argument as the theoretical foundation 
that proves the social minimum as the appropriate principle that corresponds with those 
claims. 
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It must be noted at this point that it is disappointing for Waldron to say there 
doesn’t seem to be a reason to go beyond the fulfillment of needs when it comes to a 
social minimum when he could have elaborated and positively argued exactly why the 
fulfillment of needs is as far as we should go. This non-existent elaboration of why going 
beyond fulfilling needs is unacceptable would pair well with his justification of a social 
minimum based on needs. 
 
Rawls’ response to Waldron 
In his Restatement that Rawls published decades after A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
explicitly compared mixed conceptions with the difference principle.  Rawls reiterates his 
view that the principle of restricted utility is the strongest rival to his two principles of 
justice and gives positive arguments in support of his principles over Waldron’s principle 
followed by a direct refutation of Waldron’s arguments (Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement 120). I will cover the positive arguments and then focus my attention on his 
direct refutation. 
Rawls’ comparison between his two principles and mixed conception with the 
principle of restricted utility was supposed to show how his two principles had an 
advantage with respect to reciprocity. It is through the lens of publicity that we 
understand why Rawls thought that reciprocity was to be valued. 
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Rawls believes that in addition to being general and universal, principles of 
political justice should also be public13. This means that in evaluating principles, those in 
the original position should consider the consequences of citizens publically recognizing 
that the principles “are mutually acknowledged and that they effectively regulate the 
basic structure”. One of the most important consequences Rawls believes those in the 
original position would consider is that the political conception of justice would serve an 
educational role. Relying on “commonsense political sociology”, Rawls says that we 
would think that those growing up in societies governed by the alternatives (both of 
which share equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity) would form 
conceptions of citizens as free and equal and of society as a fair system of cooperation 
between citizens viewed as free and equal. Rawls considers the conception of society as a 
fair system of cooperation to be evident from the rules of conduct that govern a society so 
he doesn’t elaborate more on it in this section (A Theory of Justice 4) Rawls considers 
this educational role a positive consequence that should be promoted. The question is 
which principle of distributive justice (difference principle of principle of restricted 
utility) best fits those conceptions. An easier way of answering the question involves 
understanding that a fair system of cooperation includes the notion of reciprocity and the 
issue is identifying which principle supports reciprocity, if either supports it at all. 
Reciprocity is the idea that members in a society cooperate and benefit 
appropriately. Let’s see how the difference principle can result in reciprocity with a 
simplified society with two groups: the more advantaged and less advantaged where we 
                                                                
13 This paragraph and the following paragraphs concerning reciprocity and stability paraphrase material 
from pages 120 to 126 in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 
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are only concerned with inequalities of income and wealth only. Starting out from equal 
division, everyone agrees to move away from inequality to improve everyone’s 
prospects. See what I wrote above, as inequalities should be accepted when everyone’s 
position is improved. Obviously not everyone benefits equally because resources are 
limited. Instead, initially some gain a lot while others gain a little. Those who gain a little 
understand this necessary imbalance and allow this to happen. From the perspective of 
those who gain a little, this group would not tolerate the more advantaged group gaining 
anything without any gain themselves or with a loss to themselves. This is how Rawls 
arrives at the difference principle, for it structures inequalities so that the least advantaged 
are in the best position possible. The least advantaged allow everyone else in society to 
gain only so far as they themselves benefit and this culminates in them having their 
prospects maximized. Rawls believes that the difference principle ensures reciprocity all 
the gains in society will help the worst off so one can think of members of society 
cooperating to aid the worst off as they improve their own prospects. More specifically, 
there is an idea in reciprocity that social institutions should not “take advantage of 
contingencies [circumstances of peoples’ lives] of native endowment, or of initial social 
position, or of good or bad luck over the course of life, except in ways that benefit 
everyone, including the least favored” (Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 124). The 
difference principle matches this as those who are more naturally or socially fortunate are 
encouraged to better themselves as long as they help everyone, especially the least 
fortunate. The principle of restricted utility only has society guarantee a social minimum 
so there’s not explicit talk of cooperation for all of society by its members. 
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Rawls’ third point in favor of the difference principle over the principle of 
restricted utility concerns stability. Stability refers to the idea that political conceptions of 
justice need to create their own support and have self-enforcing institutions. In other 
words, the citizens in these societies should support the political concepts because they 
see them as reasonable and just. Rawls believes that the more advantaged group would 
not push to gain more at the cost of the less advantaged because of these three reasons: 
1. The educational role of a public political conception urges people to wish 
for appropriate reciprocity so their conception of society as a fair system 
of cooperation is matched. The difference principle has that reciprocity (as 
Rawls argues with the second point). 
2. The more advantaged recognize any contingencies that may have helped 
them and do see opportunities to do better as long as the way they do so 
helps everyone else too.  
3. Mutual trust and cooperation are encouraged by the difference principle 
when everyone sees no one can benefit solely themselves. 
Though he doesn’t say exactly why the principle of restricted utility would not 
lead to a stable society, it is not too difficult to envision why Rawls thought this would be 
the case. The more advantaged in a society governed by mixed conception would not 
recognize the principle as containing an appropriate idea of reciprocity. They would 
likely act on behalf of their own interests, seeking more wealth and income because they 
do not see social cooperation as an idea enshrined and practiced in their society. They 
also see how the three contingencies (natural talents, social position, luck) can be taken 
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advantage of and are not controlled so they wish to capitalize on those too if they possess 
them. 
Rawls moves on to directly attacking the principle of restricted utility with three 
main points; the first two points concern utility and the last one concerns the social 
minimum14. Firstly, he attacks the indeterminacy of the point where “the sum of 
individual utilities maximized” when one considers a society with two groups of people, 
the most advantaged group and the least advantaged group (Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement 62). How are inequalities to be structured so that average utility is 
maximized? With uncertainty and unreliability as to where this point is, Rawls here 
points to the problem with all unclear and ambiguous principles: the potential for disputes 
and mistrust. This is essentially the first argument that I covered in the “Mixed 
conceptions” section. 
Secondly, Rawls thinks that asking the least advantaged to have to give up 
benefits for the more advantaged due to the utility part of the principle is too much of a 
demand to make. That is the case for the principle of restricted utility to maximize 
average utility while the least advantaged are not asked to give up anything with the 
difference principle. Rawls makes the distinction that the difference principle relies on 
reciprocity while the utility principle relies on the weaker disposition of sympathy. As 
sympathy is weaker, “[t]he psychological strain that may lead to instability are bound to 
be greater” (Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 127). Those living in a society governed 
with the utility principle have a greater risk of losing faith in society and its principles of 
justice, and thus a greater chance of breaking laws. As mentioned earlier, this is one 
                                                                
14 These points are addressed from pages 126 to 130 in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. 
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reason why the difference principle is supposed to be preferred to the principle of 
restricted utility.  
The attack on the social minimum concerns the strains of commitment and the 
ability to make an agreement in good faith. Rawls, like Waldron, understands that the 
strains of commitment can be too excessive if the minimum guaranteed in society is not 
high enough or when there is no minimum. Rawls elaborates on the excessive strains of 
commitment that Waldron explains and points out that though there’s one way in which 
their excessiveness can cause us to take violent action because society’s conception of 
justice is rejected by the least advantaged, there is also a milder way in which the least 
advantaged “grow distant from political society and retreat into [their] own social world” 
(Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 128). In the second kind of scenario, the principles 
are not recognized as correct or belonging to the participants. Since the utility principle 
says that strains of commitment are excessive when individuals do not get the share of 
resources they are owed that allow them to fulfill their essential needs, Rawls thinks that 
social minimum would only cover essential needs. Even if that social minimum prevents 
strains of commitment from being excessive in the first way (regarding violent action), it 
does not do so in the second way where the least advantaged feel like they are part of 
society and identify with its ideals and principles. The difference principle derived from 
reciprocity goes beyond the basic needs to help the least advantaged affirm the principles 
of justice and consider themselves to be full members of society. Importantly, they see 
the principles as fair as they regulate inequalities affected by the three contingencies of 
social class, natural talents and good fortune.  
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Due the complex nature of Rawls’ arguments in the Restatement, I will now 
attempt to summarize them: 
Rawls believes that thinking of the consequences of everyone in a society 
recognizing and affirming political principle makes us understand the educational role 
political conceptions of justice have on its members. These conceptions stress that 
citizens are free and equal and society should contain reciprocity, both conceptions that 
should be valued. The difference principle contains this notion of reciprocity as all 
inequality and efforts at improving one’s prospects have the goal of benefitting everyone, 
especially the poor.  
With regards to the social minimum principle, the point where average utility is 
maximized cannot be determined, the strains of commitment have a greater chance to be 
broken as the least advantaged have to give up more than they would with the difference 
principle and they would not feel like they are fully a part of a political society that they 
recognize as fair and cooperative. 
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Chapter 3: Analysis of the Debate 
For the analysis section, I’ll first consider Rawls initial objections in Theory 
Justice, examine how adequately Waldron has responded to Rawls’ initial objections, 
then look at what Rawls’ new objections in his Restatement have to offer to the debate, 
before weighing the merits of both sides to consider who has made a better case for their 
side.  
Rawls’ initial arguments 
Firstly, a quick note on Rawls’ second argument against mixed conception in A 
Theory Of Justice. Rawls’ example of how democratic societies appeal to the common 
interest by propping up those who are the least advantaged seems problematic. While it is 
true that is often is a political convention of a democratic society to appeal to the 
common interest, this does not necessarily mean that these societies understand the 
convention as helping the least advantaged. Very often in the United States, you hear 
politicians advocating for policies because their implementation will the help the middle 
class, the largest socio-economic group in the country. Or they may believe that 
appealing the common interest means passing policies that will improve the average 
spending power of everyone in the country, perhaps through something like an economic 
stimulus package. The first example demonstrates how we can understand the appeal to 
the common interest as benefitting the largest group in society whereas the second 
example contains a utilitarian slant. Moreover, Rawls points out that “[s]ince it is 
impossible to maximize with respect to more than one point of view, it is natural, given 
the ethos of a democratic society, to single out that of the least advantaged…” (A Theory 
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of Justice 280-281). It is true that we cannot maximize two or more points of view (for 
that would mean sacrificing resources that could be used to maximize one point of view 
to advance other points of view) but Rawls assumes that in our convention of appealing 
to the common interest, we only wish to maximize one point of view when that is almost 
never the case. Appealing to the common interest can mean implementing policies that 
help different groups of people in different ways. Rawls stresses the importance of 
society as a system of fair cooperation so he must recognize that solely maximizing the 
prospects of the least advantaged would not be acceptable to many members of society if 
no other points of view are considered. 
If the political convention of a democratic society to appeal to the common 
interest cannot be used to back the difference principle, is there perhaps another fixed 
point or belief that we hold strongly that naturally leads to the difference principle? 
Rawls talks about how a conception of justice needs to have a fairly detailed weighting of 
aims. These aims include prosperity, equality, social mobility, among others. The priority 
of equality seems at first glance to be a worthy aim, as most of us hold equality of all 
sorts in high regard. Even though no political system totally advocates for relative socio-
economic equality, democratic socialist philosophies call for them to a significant extent. 
Relative socio-economic equality amongst members of a society has various merits: 
participation by everyone in the political process, reduction of corporate greed and crime 
alongside reduction of criminal behavior with the intention of escaping poverty, stronger 
protection of civil rights and liberties and the feeling by citizens that they are full 
members of society. There are all consequences that parties in the original position would 
agree are positive.   
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The difference principle seems like a logical principle with which to create a 
society with relative social parity. All citizens would be allowed to use legal means to 
improve their prospects through means such as entrepreneurship, but their efforts would 
simultaneously improve the welfare of the least advantaged. This ensures that the worst-
off will always have their lives improved with any improvement in society and a 
significant disparity between the rich and the poor would not emerge.  So even though I 
find problems with Rawls’ use of the political convention of a democracy to appeal to the 
common interest as an instance of policies that we have a lot of confidence in to support 
the difference principle, I hope my substitution of society’s appeal to equality is 
adequate. 
 
Waldron’s defense of the social minimum 
Rawls’ contention that one is not able to set the social minimum in either a non-
intuitionistic way or as high as possible as the difference principle calls for is, in my 
opinion answered by Waldron so I’ll just quickly cover how that works out. Following 
the spirit of Rawls’ philosophy, Waldron points out that answering the problems of the 
“strains of commitment” does not require the difference principle. Instead, since a decent 
minimum is set by the individuals in the original position above the point where they 
cannot keep their complete commitment to the institutions of society and justice, society 
is set up so that the discontent and problems regarding the “strains of commitment” do 
not emerge. Waldron considers this a precise fix with there being no reason to go as far as 
the difference principle. Waldron disagrees with Rawls’ as to the indeterminacy of the 
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social minimum; as he believes that it is a task that psychologists and sociologists are 
well equipped to perform. Rawls seems to agree that Waldron’s answer to his criticism 
about intuitionism is valid given how he does not mention it in the Restatement.  
With that being said, Waldron has simply defended against the critique that the 
social minimum cannot be defined appropriately. Like I said earlier, he has not given us a 
reason for those in the original position to prefer the social minimum principle over the 
difference principle. On Waldron’s behalf, I will propose one reason here. 
The poor often call for provision of the necessities by the government and the 
opportunity to obtain a job so that they may provide for their family in time. Both of 
these are provided by the implementation of both principles. However, the difference 
principle goes further than this as it maximizes the chances of the worst-off to live well. 
An example of what the difference principle would do for the worst-off that the social 
minimum may not (keeping in mind the necessity to guarantee basic equal liberties and 
fair equality of opportunity) is that the worst-off may receive housing subsidies for 
housing of a quality above decent housing that others in society would not. One can 
understand how the worst-off could feel that this was something they did not truly want 
or deserve. This would be especially true in a society governed by the difference 
principle where the worst-off are only marginally worst off than the average citizen.  This 
example hopes to demonstrate that the worst-off appreciate assistance given to them by 
the government but do not want to receive the maximum level of support possible even if 
they are working hard. This goes beyond the idea of pride and concerns the self-worth of 
individuals. As Waldron points out, Rawls seems to think that the selection of the 
difference principle in the original position requires the belief that the worst off should 
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have to make no sacrifices at all in their pursuit of economic security and personal 
fulfillment. However, we all recognize that sacrifices have to be made, that even if we 
work our hardest life will present setbacks and obstacles that we have to confront. The 
overcoming of these setbacks and obstacles make us stronger, wiser and more mature. 
Allowing us to overcome them instead of removing them from our way treats us with the 
self-respect we deserve in virtue of the moral status we have as human beings. A social 
minimum provides the level of material and psychological security that would allow one 
to use their own talents and skills to attempt to make a decent living on their own terms 
while supporting a fair society that treats people with self-respect. 
 Waldron’s positive argument based on claims about needs requires same parsing 
to figure out exactly how it works. Waldron thinks that there is a level of deprivation 
where no one is able to “support, operate and respect institutions…where he can conceive 
of any practicable alternative” (Waldron 264). When enough people reach this level of 
deprivation, the society they are in loses its legitimacy and faces danger because society 
is seen to violate basic principles, ones that are arguably present in the first principle 
concerning equal liberties. The right to be treated with respect and given to chance to 
fulfill one’s own potential is violated. Taking a parallel approach to the one he took in the 
previous argument concerning the “strains of commitment”, Waldron proposes that a 
social minimum is necessary, one set above the point where people fall into this need. 
 So Waldron does not see a rationale for why we need to go beyond the fulfillment 
of the need he speaks about to the difference principle. However, this is insufficient once 
again for the selection of the principle of restricted utility over the difference principle 
because while he has done an admirable job of backing up the social minimum principle 
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with claims about need, he hasn’t stated why we have to stop there with a social 
minimum. Once again, I’ll try to provide the missing step by incorporating talk of claims 
about wants. 
 As individuals in a society, we all have wants that do not overlap with our needs. 
Some of us want supercars, others want our children to receive the best college education 
and others still want to become professional athletes. Aside from those of us with 
entitlement issues, we all recognize that there is no obligation on the part of the 
government or anyone else in society to fulfill these wants. Instead, it is up to us to 
attempt to fulfill these wants with the acknowledgement that luck will play a factor. The 
social minimum ensures that our basic material needs and other needs are met so that 
society has the support of all its citizens but the difference principle would likely aid the 
worst-off in partially fulfilling their wants because the principle goes beyond our needs. 
This would likely be true to some degree even if the fair equality of opportunity was 
followed. What this would do, somewhat surprisingly, is it would promote unfairness in 
society as society helps the worst-off without any assistance to the rich with regards to 
their wants. Any “unfair” attempt by the well-off to achieve their wants would be 
corrected policies following fair equality of opportunity so on balance, the worst-off 
would make more progress towards their wants. If this sounds implausible or perhaps 
even impossible, then one concedes that the effect of implementing the difference 
principle is no different from implementing the social minimum principle given fair 
equality of opportunity. Then one has to look at the philosophy behind the two principles 
instead of the results. 
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 At this point in the debate where we’ve looked at Waldron’s response to Rawls 
with my supplementations, let’s take a step back and see where we’re at. Rawls said that 
the setting of a social minimum principle is not possible in a non-intuitionistic way but 
we’ve seen Waldron set a social minimum in a precise and robust way. Rawls also said 
that the difference principle matched out considered judgments, our strongest moral and 
political beliefs. Keeping in mind my criticism of Rawls’ reference to the political 
convention of appealing to the common interest, Waldron indirectly rejects Rawls’ appeal 
and provides his alternative, theoretical justification for his social minimum principle 
rooted in claims of need. I’ve attempted to argue for why the worst-off would prefer a 
social minimum to having their welfare maximized under the difference principle and 
explain the problem with going beyond the fulfilment of wants to the partial fulfilment of 
needs that the difference principle would likely bring about.  
 I appeal to the ideal of equality (relative as to allow economic productivity) as a 
belief to ground the difference principle but recognize that people often feel that 
individuals deserve to largely keep what they earn in their income and wealth, because it 
is the fruit of their labor. This would allow more inequality than the difference principle 
does. Rawls would take issue with this because the contingencies (natural talents, social 
standing and luck) play a large role in what we earn, as effort seems to be the only thing 
all of us can completely control that has moral relevance to what we produce and earn. 
Regardless, I believe the debate up to now has been won by Waldron.  
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Rawls’ Restatement objections 
In his objections in the Restatement, Rawls emphasizes how the difference 
principle contains the idea of reciprocity while the principle of restricted utility in mixed 
conception does not. Everything done in that society is meant to help someone else while 
helping one’s self and the hope is that designing society this way will instill these values 
so that the laws are followed willingly and cooperation is undertaken voluntarily. Rawls’ 
simplified society is also more stable with the more advantaged group content with the 
elevation of the less advantaged group having their benefits maximized. Waldron did not 
seem to take the opportunity to respond to Rawls’ after his publication of the Restatement 
so I will attempt to defend mixed conceptions on his behalf. 
 Reciprocity is actually contained in the notion of a social minimum principle, 
though to a lesser degree. With this principle, allowing all citizens to have the means to 
live a decent life with equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity is the top 
priority of society. Everyone is indirectly supporting the worst-off in society as the 
contributions they make are deducted primarily to ensure the worst-off in society stay 
above a minimum threshold and secondarily to help society as a whole by lifting average 
utility. What this does is that is allows for reciprocity with more respect for autonomy 
and overall prosperity in society than the difference principle. There is also room in a 
society with a social minimum principle for reciprocity to emerge through the 
implementation of other principles. Rawls talks about ensuring that contingencies do not 
affect one’s success and the lack of faith citizens would have in society as a system of 
fair cooperation if they see that those contingencies could be taken advantage of. Most of 
these contingencies would be taken care of anyway with fair equality of opportunity 
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which is present in both Justice as Fairness and mixed conception. Instead of the 
difference principle where exploitation of these contingencies is guaranteed to benefit the 
worst off, a better solution may be severely limiting remaining exploitation in the first 
place or counterbalancing exploitation when it can’t be limited. The latter option would 
follow the same logic behind fair equality of opportunity. One example of curbing 
exploitation is to set up a heavy estate tax on the very rich to ensure that social standing 
isn’t completely inherited, so to speak.  
Rawls gives three objections directly attacking the social minimum but only the 
last one merits serious discussion. Rawls again reiterates in the Restatement the 
indeterminate nature of the social minimum. Given what Waldron has said, we have a 
better idea of where to place the social minimum but it still seems like there would be 
problems along the lines of what I discussed earlier about the specifics. Perhaps a better 
idea is to form some sort of loose consensus for what a social minimum consists of and 
then set it to be slightly above that to be safe and ensure that pinning down exactly what 
is necessary is not a problem. The problem of the indeterminacy of the point where 
individual utility is maximized seems like a weak one to me. Once the social minimum is 
set and has been secured for everyone in society, increasing individual utility is a matter 
of balancing effective economic legislation with necessary regulation to promote the 
economy that helps the most people.  
Rawls points out that the least advantaged may retreat from the public world 
under the social minimum because they are not given what they deserve as free and equal 
citizens. Rawls understands how Waldron’s social minimum can make the strains of 
commitment bearable in one way (with necessities, people will not feel oppressed and 
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want to take violent action) but not in the second milder way (worst-off are cynical and 
distant). However, Waldron has explicitly said that the welfare system that would be an 
implementation of the social minimum principle would not just be a single institution 
dedicated to help the worst off. Instead, principles of justice as Rawls notes apply to the 
“basic structure” of society. Every single institution in society will be geared to ensure 
that all citizens reach the social minimum and this would be recognized by the least 
advantaged. The least advantaged will see that society is doing all it can to allow them to 
live decent lives and that is all they are asking for. It is up to the least advantaged then to 
do what they can to rise above the social minimum and make their lives and future their 
own. Finally, Waldron does say that a social minimum must be set at the point so that 
everyone feels like they are “active citizens of this society”, not just so the basic 
necessities are met and dissent is avoided (Waldron, 270). The retreat of the least 
advantaged from society would not be a real problem if the social minimum was set 
appropriate to Waldron’s standards. Rawls may suggest that this point would lead to 
similar results as the implementation of the difference principle but the approach to how 
the “basic structure” of society is set up (towards a social minimum instead of helping the 
worst-off as much as possible) would still be fundamentally different. 
 
General thoughts 
 Seeing as Waldron has given a precise and robust definition of a social minimum 
and has offered an independent rationale to support the social minimum based on claims 
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of need, Rawls relies heavily on arguments concerning reciprocity to conclude that the 
difference principle is superior to the principle of restricted utility. 
At the core of Rawls’ faith in the importance of reciprocity lies his belief that 
parities in the original position would only accept principles that enable mutual trust and 
fair cooperation in society. He considers the difference principle the best principle to 
produce this reciprocity due to the strong level of equality and maximization of the life-
prospects of the worst-off that would result from its implementation. 
In my contribution to Waldron’s arguments and defense against Rawls’ 
objections, I’ve hoped to demonstrate that not only would parties in the original position 
not require the level of reciprocity that Rawls believes they would but that they would 
prefer a social minimum principle because it grants them more freedom and respect 
regardless of social position they are placed in society. Some of the concerns Rawls has 
regarding the social minimum can be addressed while others can be taken care of through 
the implementation of specific policies in a society with a social minimum.  
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Conclusion 
 This thesis has tried to explain Rawls’ theory of justice, Justice as Fairness, and 
shed light on the debate between his principles of justice and what is popularly seen as its 
strongest opponent, a version of mixed conception with the principle of restricted utility. 
We see Rawls make two sets of objections in A Theory of Justice and then in Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement. I’ve argued that Waldron successfully defends the initial 
objections and use them as a launching pad for positive arguments as to why the social 
minimum principle should be chosen. I then gave an answer against Rawls’ objection 
concerning reciprocity and give more reasons for why the social minimum would be 
picked in the original position. Thus, I believe the mixed conception with social 
minimum principle “wins” out in the debate versus Rawls’ Justice as Fairness.   
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